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EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN
NONPROFIT HEALTH CARE
ORGANIZATIONS:
WHO'S IN CHARGE?
A. L. (Lorry) Spitzert
Press reports about executive compensation levels at nonprofit or-
ganizations in general, and health care organizations in particular,
have sounded alarms and calls for reform. The headlines of these
reports give a fair indication of what's inside: "Rolling in Dough,"'
"Some Officers of Charities Steer Assets to Selves," 2 and "Scales
Tipping Against Tax Exempt Hospitals.",3 The message of these arti-
cles is clear - nonprofit health care executives get paid too much. But
the truth of the message is far more difficult to ascertain.
Some officers of nonprofit health care organizations are no doubt
"overcompensated," that is, the boards of trustees could have found
individuals of comparable skill and experience to perform the same
duties for less compensation. Many officers of nonprofit health care
organizations, however, are probably "undercompensated," that is,
these officers could obtain significantly higher pay, including some
form of equity compensation such as stock options, in the private
health care sector. These two end results - overcompensation and
undercompensation - are the inevitable consequence of the push and
pull of the compensation-setting process. While it is clearly the duty
of charitable trustees to exercise reasonable care to avoid overcom-
pensating officers, it is perfectly understandable that a hospital execu-
tive would ask to be paid the market rate for an employee of his or her
Lorry Spitzer is a partner in the Boston office of Ropes & Gray LLP.
Vince Galloro & Laura B. Benko, Rolling in Dough, MOD. HEALTHCARE,
Aug. 2, 2004, at 6 (discussing the high level of compensation for CEOs and increased
scrutiny that health care organizations are receiving).
2 Beth Healy et al., Some Officers of Charities Steer Assets to Selves,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 9, 2003, at Al (discussing how officers of private charities
foundations receive excessive salaries).
3 Julie Appleby, Scales Tipping Against Tax-Exempt Hospitals, USA
TODAY, Aug. 8, 2004, at I B (reporting on the criticisms aimed at not-for-profit hospi-
tals for high salaries given to executives, high charges and collection methods used
against uninsured patients).
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skills and level of responsibility. This is precisely how the free mar-
ket for executive talent ought to work and it should not be a cause for
despair if the end result is sometimes a bit too high or too low - if
permitted to function freely the market will adjust itself over time. As
described below, "functioning freely," includes an open and transpar-
ent compensation-setting process in which a number of interested
parties have a voice.
This paper discusses the various parties that have direct or indirect
roles in the compensation-setting process for officers of health care
organizations. The boards of trustees and the officers in question ob-
viously have a direct role in negotiating the compensation package. In
addition to the officer in question and the board of trustees, however,
donors, patients, and federal, state and local governments, all have
important roles to play. Donors exercise control by choosing to make
or withhold contributions. Patients exercise some degree of market
control if they are able to choose where (and by whom) health care
services are provided. Federal, state and local governments, hopefully
reflecting the interests and sentiments of the public, have two princi-
pal tools at their disposal: (1) more aggressive enforcement of existing
law, and (2) the enactment of new legislation.
This paper concludes that additional legislation is not needed at
the present time in order to ensure that nonprofit health care execu-
tives are fairly, but not excessively, compensated. Rather, if each of
the stakeholders described above carries out its respective role, an
appropriate balance will be struck and hospital officers will be appro-
priately compensated. While instances of apparent overcompensation
may at times arise, existing enforcement tools and market pressures
should provide a sufficient dampening effect. By contrast, legislation
seeking to "cap" hospital salaries or to otherwise limit available bene-
fits would be counter-productive and could potentially drive away
talented individuals from the nonprofit health care world.4
While the role of each of these stakeholders is critical, much of
the emphasis in this paper will be on the role of the IRS. The IRS has
recently announced a broad series of compensation audits, and the
conduct and resolution of these audits will have a significant impact
on compensation setting in the nonprofit sector.5
4 Tax Exempt Governance Proposals: Staff Discussion Draft of the Senate
Committee on Finance, 108th Cong. (2004), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004testO62204stfdis.pdf (suggesting a
cap on salaries, among other proposals). JOINT COMM'N ON TAXATION, OPTIONS TO
IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDrrURES, JCS-02-05 (2005)
available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf (among other proposals, expand and
make the I.R.C. § 4958 "intermediate sanctions" rules more harsh).
5 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, IRS INITIATIVE WILL SCRUTINIZE EO
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WHAT'S NEW?
The observation that various parties have an interest in the activi-
ties of charitable organizations and have some ability to influence
those activities is not surprising. Against the backdrop of a number of
compensation "scandals" during the past ten to fifteen years in the
nonprofit sector,6 there have been several important developments that
enable each of the stakeholders listed above to better carry out its role
in the compensation-setting process at nonprofit hospitals and other
health care organizations. These include the ready availability of
compensation data on the Internet, the enactment of the so-called "in-
termediate sanctions" rules, the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley leg-
islation that shines a spotlight on board members' fiduciary obliga-
tions, and the emergence of a number of compensation factors unique
to nonprofit health care organizations.
I. The Information Revolution
The Internet has completely changed the ability of various non-
governmental stakeholders in charitable organizations to play a mean-
ingful and informed role in overseeing such organizations. The lead-
ing provider of Internet-based information about charities is Guide-
Star, itself a tax-exempt organization, whose stated goal is "to revolu-
tionize philanthropy and nonprofit practice with information. 7 By
providing ready access to IRS Forms 990 for more than a million
nonprofit organizations, combined with comparative data assembled
COMPENSATION PRACTICES, at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/
0,,id=128328,00.html (Aug. 10, 2004).
6 For examples of compensation scandals, see e.g., Aramony v. United Way
of America, 28 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (discussing the extent to which
former president Aramony was entitled to benefits under the United Way's benefits
plan in light of the fact that Aramony breached his fiduciary duty to the corporation);
William L. Gardner & Emmett B. Lewis, Ethical Considerations When Representing
Non-Profit and Tax-Exempt Organizations, REPRESENTING & MANAGING TAX-
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS at 1-2 (Georgetown University Law Center Continuing
Legal Education, Apr. 26-27, 2001) (commenting on the excessive compensation
given to the trustees of the Bishop Estate); Sacha Pfeiffer & Beth Healy, Founda-
tions' Tax Returns Left Unchecked, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 29, 2003, at Al (highlight-
ing the lack of oversight associated with the tax returns of charitable foundations);
Marcella Bombardieri & Walter V. Robinson, Wealthiest Nonprofits Favored by
Foundations, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 11, 2004, at Al (describing favoritism towards
certain non-profits that are not particularly needy); Beth Healy & Walter V. Robin-
son, GE Sent Funds to Five Directors' Foundations, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 20, 2004, at
F1 (explaining that GE has repeatedly made large donations to former directors'
private foundations for the purpose of bolstering the reputation of the directors).
7 GUIDESTAR, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.guidestar.org (last
visited Feb. 13, 2005).
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for different types and sizes of nonprofit organizations, GuideStar
facilitates the analysis of executive compensation within the nonprofit
sector.8 It is a simple matter, for example, for a nonprofit community
hospital to ascertain the compensation levels paid by its main com-
petitors, as well as that of similar-sized hospitals throughout the coun-
try. It is also a simple matter for a potential donor or patient of a hos-
pital to access this same information.
State charity regulators have also made huge strides in making in-
formation about charities freely available to the public. A number of
states have their own information return for charitable organizations
and make that return, as well as the IRS Form 990, easily available
through an on-line search or by visiting their offices.9
While there is no shortage of information available about non-
profit organizations, including compensation levels, it is the responsi-
bility of those who seek to monitor and influence such organizations
to examine such information. It is likely that a significant portion of
the available information is incorrect, missing, or inconsistently re-
ported. It is for this reason that the first task of the current IRS com-
pensation audits will likely be to ascertain the accuracy and complete-
ness of information made available on the IRS Form 990.10 The IRS
should then use a combination of targeted enforcement efforts, educa-
tional outreach, and possibly modifications to the Form 990 in an ef-
fort to improve the quality of publicly-available information. Even if
the IRS does not prosecute a single "excess benefit" case under the
intermediate sanctions rules discussed below, its efforts will have
been successful if it is able to significantly improve the quality and
consistency of information made available to the public.
II. Intermediate Sanctions
The "intermediate sanctions" rules, which are contained in § 4958
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the Code), were
enacted as part of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, which President Clin-
ton signed into law on July 30, 1996.11 Final Treasury regulations
implementing § 4958 became effective on January 23, 2002.12 Sec-
8 id.
9 E.g., FOUNDATION CENTER, "Can Nonprofit Organizations file IRS Form
990 Electronically?" http://fdncenter.org/learn/faqs/htmil/990_electronic.html.
10 The IRS has indicated that it is will contact approximately 2,000 nonprofit
organizations by 2005 to verify amounts reported on Form 990. INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, IRS INITIATIVE WILL SCRUTINIZE EO COMPENSATION PRACTICES, at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/,,id=128328,00.html (Aug. 10, 2004).
"I Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996).
12 Excise Taxes on Excess Benefit Transactions, 67 Fed. Reg. 3076 (Jan. 23,
2002) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 53, pt. 301, and pt. 602).
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tion 4958 was intended to provide the IRS with a lesser remedy than
revocation of tax-exempt status in instances of private inurement -
hence the colloquial name "intermediate" sanctions. 13 Previously, if
an exempt organization allowed any part of its net earnings to inure to
the benefit of a private individual (the so-called private inurement
doctrine) the IRS had only a single option: to revoke the entity's tax
exempt status. Because this penalty was so severe and was not tar-
geted at the individuals who were responsible for the private inure-
ment, it was seldom used and was therefore thought to be an ineffec-
tive enforcement tool.1
4
Section 4958 provides that when a disqualified person engages in
an excess benefit transaction with an applicable tax-exempt organiza-
tion, both the disqualified person and any organization manager who
knowingly participates in the transaction will be liable for excise
taxes: 15 a veritable wonderland of defined terms. While each of the
defined terms is the subject of a fairly nuanced definition, the issue
often boils down to "did the organization pay its CEO (or other or-
ganization insider) too much? ' 16 A hospital described in § 501(c)(3)
of the Code is clearly an "applicable tax exempt organization," the
president and other key hospital officers are "disqualified persons"
and the members of the board of trustees (or board subcommittee re-
sponsible for setting compensation) are "organization managers" who
13 WILLIAM ARCHER, TAXPAYER BILL OF RIGHTS 2, H.R. REP. No. 104 -506 at
59 n. 15 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1143, 1182 n. 15.
14 The in terrorem effect of threatened loss of tax exempt status should not
be understated, however, and such threat is periodically used by the IRS to persuade
exempt organizations to enter into closing agreements that often require monetary
penalties and a change of governance procedures.
15 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1(a) (2002).
16 The issue of what constitutes reasonable compensation, central to the
intermediate sanctions rules, is hardly a new one for tax practitioners. Section
162(a)(1) of the Code limits a business's deduction for compensation to a "reasonable
allowance." Closely held corporations have an incentive to overpay their controlling
shareholders, however, in order to avoid the corporate level of tax incurred on earn-
ings and profits used to fund non-deductible dividends. Hence an excessive salary
can constitute a disguised dividend to the employee. Because charitable organizations
are expressly forbidden to pay dividends to any private party because of the prohibi-
tion on private inurement found in Code § 501(c)(3), the case law under Code §
162(a)(1) for determining what is reasonable compensation should prove instructive,
perhaps even controlling, in the context of § 4958. In this regard, it is not comforting
(nor surprising) that a recent commentator described the current "multifactor test" of
reasonable compensation under Code § 162(a)(1) as "unpredictable and equivocal"
with the outcome of cases "necessarily determined by subjective judicial judgment
and arbitrary decision-making." See Jason L. Behrens, What is Reasonable Compen-
sation for Deduction Purposes? Two Tests Exist But Neither Paints a Clear Picture,
as Evidenced in Devine Bros. v. Commissioner, 57 TAX LAW., 793, 799-800 (2004).
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"knowingly" approve compensation. 17 This leaves only the question
of whether an "excess benefit transaction" has occurred (the "too
much pay?" question).
The passage of the intermediate sanctions legislation in 1996 cre-
ated some confusion and consternation among tax-exempt organiza-
tions. While the confusion is not surprising, the consternation is often
out of proportion to the impact of the new rules. Although the IRS
has been given a new enforcement tool, many exempt organizations
will now face a reduced risk of loss of tax exemption because of the
payment of excess compensation and, in addition, are given a "safe
harbor" procedure for making difficult compensation decisions.1
8
Although the IRS may still revoke an organization's tax-exempt
status for violating the inurement proscription - regardless of whether
it imposes the 4958 excise tax - the legislative history suggests that,
in practice, the excise taxes often will be the sole sanction imposed
when the excess benefit is not sufficiently severe to raise doubts about
the organization's identity as a charitable organization. 19 Nonetheless,
the preamble to the final intermediate sanctions regulations explicitly
state that the IRS may pursue both intermediate sanctions penalties
and loss of tax exemption in instances where private inurement is
found.2°
A. The Penalty Taxes
If a disqualified person engages in an excess benefit transaction
with a tax-exempt organization (for the purposes of this paper, this
means the receipt of unreasonable compensation), both the disquali-
fied person and any organization manager who knowingly participates
in the transaction are liable for excise taxes. 21 The exempt organiza-
tion itself is not subject to the penalty tax. 22 Penalty taxes are calcu-
lated as a percentage of the "excess benefit," which is defined as the
amount by which the benefit provided to the disqualified person ex-
ceeds the value of the consideration (i.e., services) received by the
organization.23
17 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1 (2002) (giving the definitions of organization
manager and knowingly).
18 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6 (2002).
19 WILLIAM ARCHER, TAXPAYER BILL OF RIGHTS 2, H.R. REP. No. 104 -506 at
59 n.15 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1143, 1182 n.15.
20 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-8(a) (2002).
2 I.R.C. § 4958(a)-(b)(2000).
22 I.R.C. § 4958(a) (2000) (conferring tax only onto disqualified persons and
management).
23 I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1)(a) (2000).
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The disqualified person is liable for a tax equal to twenty-five
percent of the excess benefit, and then, if the excess benefit is not
corrected within the taxable period, for an additional tax of 200%.4
A penalty tax is also imposed on any organization manager who par-
ticipates in the transaction knowingly, willfully, and without reason-
able cause. The tax is equal to ten percent of the excess benefit, not
to exceed $10,000 with respect to any one excess benefit transaction.16
The organization managers' liability is joint and several, with all or-
ganization managers limited by a single $10,000 cap per excess bene-
fit transaction.27 If an organization manager is also a disqualified per-
son, he or she can be subject to both types of excise taxes.28
B. The Rebuttable Presumption Safe Harbor
The regulations provide a safe harbor that enables the organiza-
tion to establish a rebuttable presumption that no excess benefit trans-
action has occurred, i.e., that compensation paid to an officer is rea-
sonable.29 The IRS may rebut this presumption by providing evidence
that the compensation was not reasonable. Failure to meet the rebut-
table presumption does not create the inference that a transaction be-
tween a disqualified person and an exempt organization is an excess
benefit transaction.3°
Compensation arrangements are presumed to be reasonable if the
following three conditions are satisfied:
31
1. Independent Committee:
The specific compensation arrangement must be approved by the
organization's governing body or a group of individuals appointed by
the governing body that is made up of disinterested individuals.32
Members of the board or committee cannot be related to the disquali-
fied person benefiting from the compensation arrangement, be in a
subordinate employment relationship to such person, receive compen-
sation subject to the person's approval, have a material financial inter-
est affected by the arrangement, or be involved in approving a recip-
24 I.R.C. § 4958 (a)-(b) (2000).
25 I.R.C. § 4958 (a)(2) (2000).
26 I.R.C. § 4958 (d)(2) (2000).
27 I.R.C. § 4958 (d)(1) (2000).
28 Treas. Reg. §53.4958-1(a) (2002).
29 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6 (2002).
30 Id.
31 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a) (2002).
32 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a)(1) (2002).
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rocal arrangement with the person.33 A board containing a disquali-
fied member will nevertheless qualify as an independent committee if
the disqualified member recuses himself from the meeting and is not
present during the debate and voting regarding the compensation ar-
rangement.34 Individuals other than officers, directors or trustees may
serve on the committee, but they will then be treated as organization
managers for purposes of the penalty tax on managers. 35 The transac-
tion cannot be approved by a committee if either the organization's
governing document or state law requires that the committee's deci-
sion be ratified by the full governing body in order to become effec-
tive.36
2. Reliance on Appropriate Data:
The board or committee must base its decision on appropriate
data, which includes compensation levels paid by similarly situated
organizations (whether taxable or tax-exempt) for comparable posi-
tions, independent compensation surveys compiled by independent
firms, and actual written offers from other institutions competing for
the disqualified person's services.37 Organizations with annual gross
receipts of less than one million dollars need only obtain compensa-
tion data from five comparable organizations in similar communities,
for similar services.38
3. Documentation:
The board or committee must document the basis for its decision
in minutes or other records by the later of the next meeting of the
board or committee or sixty days after the meeting at which the com-
pensation decision was made. 39 The records must indicate the terms
of the transaction, the date of approval, the members present and who
voted in favor of the transaction, the source and substance of the data
relied upon, and the actions taken by persons excluded because of
their conflict of interest.40
It is hard to quarrel with the foregoing procedure for establishing
a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. It is simple and logical.
While some interpretive and procedural issues can arise when seeking
33 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(iii) (2002).
34 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(ii) (2002).
35 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(i) (2002).
36 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(i)(B) (2002).
37 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(2) (2002).
38 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a)(2)(ii) (2002).
39 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(ii) (2002).
40 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(i) (2002).
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to follow the three steps, the basic procedure comports so well with
exempt organization "best practices" that it is likely to become a vir-
tual requirement when establishing the compensation package for key
individuals at larfe nonprofit organizations, including those in the
health care sector.
III. Sarbanes-Oxley and its Progeny
Although not directly applicable to nonprofit organizations, the
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation has created a different
tenor at nonprofit organizations. Due in part to board members' ex-
perience with Sarbanes-Oxley in the private sector, boards of trustees
have become increasingly active in seeking to fulfill their fiduciary
obligations in a manner that can be objectively established, in particu-
lar with respect to compensation setting. Several states, including
New York and Massachusetts, are considering the enactment of legis-
lation that will apply to nonprofit organizations rules similar to those
contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, and California has re-
cently enacted such legislation.42
IV. Issues Unique to Health Care Executives
Most of this paper addresses issues that apply equally to health
care executives and to executives of nonprofit organizations in gen-
eral. But several factors apply uniquely to the health care industry
and should be kept in mind when analyzing reasonable compensation
in the nonprofit health care sector.
Competition for talent with the for-profit sector. First and fore-
most, there exists in the health care industry a vigorous competition
for talent between for-profit and not-for-profit health care providers.
A CEO of a nonprofit hospital could easily make the crossover to a
for-profit hospital and vice versa. While the intermediate sanctions
rules clearly state that compensation levels may be set with reference
to both the for-profit and nonprofit sectors, the reference to compara-
ble employees in the for-profit sector is often something of an abstract
proposition. Who, precisely, performs a role in the for-profit sector
comparable to that of the president of a university or charitable foun-
dation? Yet in the health care industry, while important differences
41 In fact, a form of such review has recently become legislatively required in
California as part of the Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004 with respect to the chief
executive officer and chief financial officer of all charities subject to the jurisdiction
of the California Attorney General. S.B. 1262, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca.
2004).
42 The Nonprofit Integrity Act, Ca. S.B. 1262.
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exist, it is far easier to identify comparable positions in for-profit hos-
pitals. To the extent that large for-profit hospitals tend to compensate
their executives well, not only through direct salary but also through
stock options, deferred compensation, and retirement programs, non-
profit hospitals are required to offer total compensation packages of at
least somewhat comparable value in order to attract and retain the
most talented executives.
Compensation level of doctors in general. A second factor that
helps explain relatively high executive compensation levels in the
health care industry is that doctors working for or in conjunction with
health care organizations themselves tend to be fairly highly compen-
sated compared to, for example, a typical college professor, artist or
grantmaker who make up the bulk of most nonprofit organizations'
skilled employees. There is much less resistance, either internally or
from the public, if an executive of a nonprofit organization is paid at a
level reasonably commensurate with the salary paid to the skilled in-
dividuals whom he or she manages on a daily basis.
Commercial revenue as a gauge of success. Third, hospitals tend
to be more "commercial" than most nonprofit organizations, relying
on operating revenues for a larger portion of their budget than many
other nonprofit organizations. This makes it easier for an executive to
point to revenues of the organization in arguing that he or she should
be paid at a level commensurate with an executive at a private com-
pany with comparable revenues.
No stock options. Fourth, the fact that nonprofit executives can-
not be compensated with stock options available in the for-profit
health care sector also tends to inflate current salaries because current
cash would need to make up for the absence of potential growth in
equity. Recent attempts by nonprofit organizations to create phantom
stock-option plans for nonprofit executives (albeit with the options
being for a pool of publicly-traded securities, not for equity in the
exempt organization itself) were firmly squelched by the IRS.43
Volatility. Fifth, the high degree of volatility in the health care
industry clearly tends to push compensation levels higher. An execu-
tive who sees his or her job position as perilous, and who faces termi-
nation for any number of reasons outside the executive's control, will
presumably push much harder for "top dollar" when negotiating an
employment agreement."
41 I.R.C. § 457 (2000).
44 Treas. Reg. § 1.457-11(d) (2002). See also Anup Malani & Albert Choi,
Are Non-Profit Firms Simply For-Profits in Disguise? Evidence from Executive
Compensation in the Nursing Home Industry, Sept. 26, 2004, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract~id=617362. Malani and Choi argue
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THE ROLE OF PRIVATE STAKEHOLDERS IN
SETTING COMPENSATION
Boards of Trustees
Boards of trustees must be diligent in carrying out their fiduciary
obligation to analyze compensation packages carefully and independ-
ently. While this statement seems obvious, far too many boards of
trustees are less than diligent in carrying out this basic function. A
reasonable compensation-setting approach is established by the rebut-
table presumption "safe harbor" under the intermediate sanctions rules
described above,45 and the board should seek to follow these rules at a
minimum. In particular, the board should check for (and address)
conflicts of interest, it should review the skills and job demands of the
officer and determine how much comparable individuals earn, and it
should keep a record if its deliberations.
While there is little doubt that the board of trustees (or its desig-
nated committee) should control the CEO's compensation, it is less
clear that it should be principally responsible for determining com-
pensation levels of other employees, even if they constitute disquali-
fied persons under § 4958. While the board should retain the author-
ity to be the final arbiter of compensation for key individuals, per the
intermediate sanctions rules, it should not exercise this authority in a
manner that undercuts the CEO of the organization.
Stephen Sample argues in In Your Hands a Sacred Trust that the
board of trustees must be careful to not unnecessarily interject itself
into personnel issues at a university, observing that the employee in
question would come to view him or herself as working for the board,
not the president, in that case.46 Sample supports giving the president
of a university a high level of executive authority, with a concomitant
• •• 47
level of responsibility. He recounts, somewhat wistfully perhaps,
the story of a 19th century college trustee who suggested that the ideal
agenda for a board meeting would be as follows:
that because nonprofits are penalized in various ways for using financial performance
incentives, they must rely on turnover to encourage executives to maximize profits
(i.e. "we're sorry that we can't give you stock options or a profit-based bonus, but
we'll fire you if you don't perform well."). As a result of this volatility, base com-
pensation levels need to be higher in the for-profit sector. The Malani and Choi arti-
cle also contains a helpful list of references to recent academic articles regarding
executive compensation in the nonprofit sector. Id. at 29.
45 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6 (2002).
46 Stephen Sample, In Your Hands a Sacred Trust, TRuSTEESIP, Nov.-Dec.
2003, at 15, 17.
47 See id. at 16.
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"The meeting should open with a prayer, and after approval of
the minutes of the earlier meeting, one of the trustees should
immediately move to dismiss the president. If the motion
fails, the meeting should adjourn !,,48
Sample raises an important issue. Should the role of the board of
trustees in setting the CEO's compensation be treated as fundamen-
tally different from its role in reviewing the compensation levels of
other key officers? In the former case, the board must take a leader-
ship role in negotiating an employment agreement, dealing directly
with compensation consultants and other legal or accounting advisors.
But in the latter case, it may be appropriate for the board to be defer-
ential to the recommended compensation levels proposed by the CEO.
While the board must clearly satisfy itself that the compensation lev-
els are reasonable, it should work cooperatively with the president to
address any concerns or questions board members may have. If the
board has a fundamental disagreement with the compensation policy
of the president, this disagreement should factor importantly in its
decision whether to retain the president, but should not be used as an
excuse to undercut the CEO's authority or to begin micromanaging
the affairs of the organization.
Potential Donors
Potential donors should evaluate the wide array of publicly-
available information in order to understand the levels of compensa-
tion being paid as well as other expenses of a charitable organization;
these expenses should be compared to the goals, complexity and suc-
cess of the organization. Federal, state and local governments can
also act very much like a private donors in this regard. Governmental
funding agencies have the ability to pick and choose among recipients
of governmental grants based on a host of factors, including executive
compensation. From a free market perspective, it is more efficient for
governmental "control" over compensation levels in the charitable
sectors to be exercised by giving or withholding funds, as opposed to
the IRS or a state attorney general trying to successfully litigate its
view that a particular executive was overcompensated or that the or-
ganization is not managed efficiently. Like the public, the govern-
ment can speak with its money.
48 Id. at 15.
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Patients
Patients, and their advocates, will likely be less concerned with
compensation levels than they will be concerned with results; an or-
ganization that consistently under-compensates its key employees
may fail attract the best talent and quality may suffer. ("May" and not
"will" is used in the preceding sentence because the nonprofit sector is
populated by many highly-talented individuals who effectively make a
charitable contribution of their time and talent and willingly accept
under-compensation in order to serve the charitable mission of the
organization. While admirable, such selflessness is not legally re-
quired and probably cannot be expected across the board.) Of late,
some patients have exercised another kind of clout by participating in
so-called "Scruggs lawsuits' 49 brought against tax exempt hospitals
challenging billing practices for the uninsured; discovery requests in
these cases have explored compensation-setting processes at the de-
fendant hospitals in an attempt to demonstrate that the hospital has not
been operated in an exclusively charitable manner.
THE ROLE OF IRS AUDIT ACTIVITY
Donors (including governmental grant makers) and patients of
nonprofit health care organizations perform a market-based role in
regulating these organizations - if they are not happy with what they
see they take their money elsewhere. While this kind of natural regu-
lation is desirable, the IRS obviously has an important and continuing
role to play. The IRS has recently announced its intention to perform
widespread audits of exempt organizations with a particular focus on
compensation levels and information reporting.5° This is an important
initiative by the IRS and one that could have significant repercussions
throughout the nonprofit world. Because these audits will constitute
the first significant test of the effect of the intermediate sanctions leg-
islation of 1996, the IRS, exempt organizations, and their advisors
will be highly interested in the results.
But what, exactly, should be the goal of these audits and how will
their success be measured? As with so many issues involving tax-
exempt organizations, success will not be measured in revenues
49 44 Class Action Lawsuits in 23 States Filed to Date by Uninsured Patient
Plaintiffs Against Nonprofit Hospitals, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 13, 2004, at
http://news.findlaw.com/prnewswire/200 4 0813/13aug2004165413.html.
50 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, IRS INITIATIVE WILL SCRUTINIZE EO
COMPENSATION PRACTICES, at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/
0,,id=128328,00.html (Aug. 10, 2004).
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raised.51 Rather, the success of these audits should be measured by
the following criteria. Does the IRS deal fairly and effectively with
those organizations being audited - imposing penalties where appro-
priate and requiring improved procedural safeguards where the proc-
ess has been flawed? Do the audits enable the IRS to gather helpful
data about nonprofit compliance that will enable the IRS to (a) better
educate the exempt organization community, (b) improve the Form
990 so as to best report compensation and benefits, and (c) enable the
IRS to conduct further audits in a targeted manner? Finally, and most
importantly, do the audits results in more complete and more reliable
compensation data being made publicly available so that the stake-
holders described above can better serve their market-based role in
regulating nonprofits?
When the IRS examines the compensation paid to a nonprofit
health care executive there are four possible results, as follows:
" The executive is paid a reasonable amount and appropriate
procedures were followed in setting, and reporting, compen-
sation.
* The executive is paid a reasonable amount, but appropriate
compensation procedures were not followed.
" The executive is arguably paid too much, but appropriate
compensation procedures were followed.
51 An interesting aspect of "excessive compensation" audits is that IRS
agents performing such audits are being asked, in effect, to seek to minimize federal
tax revenues. IRS regulation of tax-exempt organizations has always been a curious
state of affairs - the IRS essentially filling a void left by the inaction of most state
charity regulators. But, in most cases, the IRS could at least be seen as seeking to
protect federal revenues. If a charitable organization is stripped of its tax-exempt
status by the IRS, additional federal revenues may accrue because of decreased chari-
table contributions to that organization and because of tax on operating and invest-
ment income of the charity if the revocation is retroactive. Audits of unrelated busi-
ness activities can also generate additional federal revenues, as could a typical em-
ployment tax or retirement plan audit. Yet the payment of excessive compensation
works in the opposite direction. Every $100 of excess compensation paid to an al-
ready highly compensated executive gives the federal government a windfall of ap-
proximately $35 in income taxes and three dollars in employment taxes. It is unlikely
that the IRS will successfully offset these revenue losses by the imposition of either
the 25% or 200% penalties under § 4958 (a)-(b) or the 10% managers' penalty under
§ 4958 (a)(2). Far more likely would be an agreement by the executive to simply
return some of the excess compensation to the organization, for which he or she
would claim an offsetting tax deduction, thereby reducing federal tax revenues.
While the foregoing situation should not be seen as a call for IRS inaction in order to
help balance the federal budget, it highlights the fact that the IRS Exempt Organiza-
tions Division is being asked to stray even further from its traditional role of safe-
guarding federal revenues and to squarely shoulder the job of charitable overseer, a
job more appropriately handled by state attorneys general.
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e The executive is arguably paid too much and appropriate
compensation procedures were not followed.
In the first situation all parties go away happy. In the second
situation (reasonable pay, inappropriate process), the well-meaning
but perhaps ill-advised nonprofit may face an uncomfortable conver-
sation with the IRS about "automatic excess benefit transactions" (i.e.
items of compensation not treated as such) 52 or about correct informa-
tion reporting. Many nonprofits will fall in this category and it is im-
perative that the IRS handle these cases in an appropriate manner -
firm but understanding. Playing "Gotcha!" with relatively minor
items of compensation such as automobile use, cell phones, dis-
counted goods and services and the like will not be especially helpful
and the intermediate sanctions penalties should be applied sparingly in
these cases.
In the third situation (high pay, appropriate process), the IRS will
have a difficult time making intermediate sanctions penalties stick. A
committee that has carefully ensured that no member has a conflict of
interest, has analyzed data as to salaries paid to individuals of compa-
rable skill and responsibility in the nonprofit and commercial sectors,
and has recorded its deliberations and the rationale for its conclusions
will have built a solid case that the compensation level is reasonable
and will benefit from a presumption to this effect. While there will
likely be extreme cases that prove to be the exception, it will be very
difficult for the IRS to successfully argue that an executive who is
paid, for example, one million dollars was really only worth $500,000,
notwithstanding the deliberations of the board or compensation com-
mittee.
Finally, organizations that have paid "top dollar" for an executive
and have not followed the recommended compensation-setting proce-
dures will find themselves in a compromised position with the IRS.
As is often the case with nonprofit organizations that must deal with
somewhat vague restrictions ("substantial" lobbying, "unrelated"
business, and "excess" compensation), careful procedural safeguards
and documentation are key. If the IRS hopes to have an impact on
compensation-setting in the nonprofit sector, it should measure its
success in the adoption by charities of procedural safeguards, not a
win-loss record when battling over the definition of reasonable com-
pensation.
52 Fred Stokeld, Agents Shouldn't Get Carried Away With Minor 4958 Viola-
tions, IRS Official Says, PLANNED GIVING DESIGN CENTER, May 03, 2004, at
http://www.pgdc.com/usa/item/?itemlD=207217.
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CONCLUSION
A market-based approach to compensation setting in the nonprofit
health care sector is far preferable to direct governmental regulation of
salaries. The IRS is simply not in a position to start determining ap-
propriate compensation levels for executives in a complex, frag-
mented, ever-changing industry. While some might argue that inter-
mediate sanctions have failed if the IRS cannot use them to directly
exert a downward pressure on salaries, this is not the case. Intermedi-
ate sanctions are most beneficial in strongly encouraging a compensa-
tion-setting process, not in actually serving to depress salaries across
the nonprofit spectrum.53 The current IRS audits of nonprofit com-
pensation levels will serve the important role of pushing exempt or-
ganizations towards greater accuracy and uniformity in reporting sal-
ary levels on the IRS Form 990. As noted above, these audits will
probably reveal both sloppiness in reporting of compensation by many
organizations as well as highlight ambiguities and omissions in the
Form 990 itself. The combination of a serious enforcement effort
with respect to compensation reporting, plus an improved Form 990
and instructions, will greatly facilitate the effectiveness of third-party
oversight of charitable organizations, such as that exercised by donors
and patients.
53 In fact, intermediate sanctions may have had an inflationary influence on
salaries, providing a protective umbrella beneath which salaries can be raised with
relative impunity. By providing an easy-to-apply safe harbor for creating the rebut-
table presumption, together with the natural tendency to assume than an organiza-
tion's executive is "above average," (the "Lake Wobegon Effect") salaries will tend
to grow. In addition, even for organizations not intent on pushing salaries to the
maximum, the ready availability of comparability data, combined with the appropriate
use of the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness, will likely cause organizations
with below-average compensation to increase compensation levels towards the mean.
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